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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101: Pretrial examination permitted in matrimonial action.
In Hochberg v. Hochberg,71 the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
rejected the deeply rooted, restrictive approach toward disclosure in
matrimonial actions and granted plaintiff-wife's motion for leave to
examine the defendant with respect to earnings and financial status.
Ordinarily, such a motion would be denied on the grounds that the
pretrial examination would be burdensome and that it would jeopar-
dize the parties' chances for a reconciliation. 2 As a result, while other
areas of article 31 were being accorded liberal interpretations, 3 dis-
closure in matrimonial actions was limited to those instances in which
a party could prove "special circumstances." 74
Undoubtedly, pretrial examination proceedings may still be
troublesome. However, under the DRL,7 r the parties must attend ex-
tensive conciliation proceedings before a matrimonial action can be
pursued. If conciliation attempts prove futile (and this is evidenced
by the fact that the matrimonial action is progressing), then the policy
ground for withholding the advantages of disclosure - the hope of
reconciliation -is no longer plausible.7 6 Thus, courts should follow
the realistic approach of Hochberg, while retaining power to issue a
protective order in appropriate circumstances.
CPLR 3130: Interrogatories prohibited in wrongful death action based
on breach of warranty.
CPLR 3130 proscribes the use of written interrogatories in an
action to recover "damages for any injury to property, or a personal
injury, resulting from negligence, or wrongful death." In addition, the
section prohibits the service of interrogatories if a bill of particulars
has already been demanded. These limitations evidence the reluctance
7163 Misc. 2d 77, 310 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
72 See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't
1959); see generally CARmODY-FoRKoSCH, NEW YORK PRACmCE 575-76 (8th ed. 1963).
It should be noted that it is public policy, rather than the CPLR, which restricts the
use of disclosure devices in a matrimonial action. H. WACHIELL, NEW YoRn PRACTICE
UNDER THE CPLR 238 (3d ed. 1970). Cf. Nomako v. Ashton, 20 App. Div. 2d 331, 247
N.Y.S.2d 230 (lst Dep't 1964).
73 See, e.g., Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430,
288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
74 See Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1960);
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 40 Misc. 2d 672, 243 N.Y.S2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963); see
also H. WAcrTELL, NEW YoRr PRACricE UNDER THE CPLR 238 (3d ed. 1970).
75 DRL § 215(e) et seq. (McKinney 1967).
76 See 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 15 at 18-20 (1970); cf. Gleason v. Glea-
son, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
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on the part of the legislature to include interrogatory practice in the
CPLR.77 Indeed, the original intendment"s to elevate interrogatories to
a position of importance similar to that under federal practice79 has been
largely thwarted, particularly in view of the negligence exclusion which
automatically barred interrogatories from the majority of New York
cases. 80
In personal injury and property damage actions, a distinction has
been drawn between strict negligence Claims8 ' and those based on
breach of warranty: interrogatories have been allowed in the latter
instance but not the former.8 2 However, it has been held in Rothholz
v. Chrysler Corp.s3 that the use of interrogatories in wrongful death
actions is prohibited regardless of the underlying theory of liability.
The action in Rothholz was commenced to recover damages for
personal injuries and wrongful death allegedly sustained as the result
of defendant's negligence and breach of warranty. In response to a
motion for a preclusion order on the ground that answers to certain
interrogatories had not been served, the plaintiff contended that the
interrogatories relating to the wrongful death action were improper
and that a protective order should issue.84 Recognizing the soundness
of one authority's viewpoint that it is illogical to allow interrogatories
in personal injury actions based on breach of warranty but not in a
wrongful death action predicated upon the same theory of liability, 5
the court, nonetheless, felt constrained by the wording of CPLR 3130
from sanctioning such an approach. Thus, the interrogatories relating to
breach of warranty in the wrongful death action were ordered stricken.
Analytically speaking, the court's construction is correct since the
reference to the exclusion of interrogatories in personal injury actions
"resulting from negligence" is not repeated in the following phrase
77The interrogatory provisions were excluded by the 1962 legislature. They were
reinserted in 1963, but with diminished scope. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3130, com-
mentary 2 at 668 (1970).
78 See FsRsr REP. 148.
79 FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
80 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3130, commentary 3 at 669 (1970).
81 Substance controls form so that the interrogatory is excluded whenever negligence
is the crux of the claim. See Fiorentino v. Jaques, 41 Misc. 2d 972, 246 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1964).
82 See Ford Motor Co. v. 0. W. Burke Co., 51 Misc. 2d 420, 273 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1966); see also The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 642, 655 (1967).83 62 Misc. 2d 901, 309 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970).
84 The plaintiff also contended that the interrogatories were improper since the de-
fendant had previously served a demand for a bill of particulars. However, this objection
was deemed to be without merit since defendant had withdrawn his demand. Accord, 3
WK&M 3130.03.
85 See 7B MCKINNEYS CPLR 3130, commentary 3 at 671 (1970).
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dealing with wrongful death. But, as pointed out by Professor Siegel,
this is not an area for literal interpretation. 6 It is incongruous not to
adopt the "limited to negligence" language in wrongful death actions
where the plaintiff is also suing for personal injuries; the claims can be
joined and, if the death is traceable to the injury, liability "would rest
on the same foundation that supports the liability for the personal in-
jury., 87
ARTICLE 32- ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3212: Summary judgment granted despite plaintiffs failure to
allege freedom from contributory negligence.
In DePaul v. George,8 plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by
defendant, moved for summary judgment on the ground that defen-
dant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of his negli-
gence as a result of a prior judgment against him. 9 On appeal from an
order granting summary judgment, defendant contended that plaintiff's
freedom from contributory negligence had been neither alleged nor
proved in the lower court. A majority of the First Department was,
nonetheless, of the opinion that in a passenger versus driver situation,
the driver should be aware of whether his passenger was contributorily
negligent. Thus, the driver, on his own initiative, should come forward
with any evidence regarding plaintiff's misconduct without requiring
the plaintiff "to institute the first movement of a ritualistic dance" 90
by alleging freedom from contributory negligence.
Normally, of course, freedom from contributory negligence is an
intricate part of plaintiff's cause of action which must be pleaded and
proved.91 However, appellate courts have generally adopted a permis-
sive attitude toward granting summary judgment where, as in DePaul,
a passenger is suing his host driver.92 In this instance, plaintiff's conduct
is rarely an actual issue in the case.93 Thus, although good practice
dictates an exculpatory affidavit by plaintiff, the failure to insert what
is essentially a pro forma allegation should not prejudice his claim.
86 Id.
S7 lId.
88 34 App. Div. 2d 620, 309 N.YS.2d 90 (1st Dep't 1970).
89 Cf. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.YS.2d 596
(1967).
90 34 App. Div. 2d at 620, 309 N.YS.2d at 92.
91Weston v. City of Troy, 139 N.Y. 281, 34 N.E. 780 (1893).
92 See, e.g., Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1960);
see also 4 WK&M 3212.03.
93 See, e.g., Schembri v. Burke, 57 Misc. 2d 703, 293 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1968); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1968).
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